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Applying Domestic Statutes to Foreign 
Conduct: How Much Does Kiobel Touch 
and Concern the Presumption Against 
Extraterritorial Application 
Jessica Neer McDonald* 
This paper examines a tumultuous history of applying 
United States law to foreign conduct in United States federal 
courts and the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions in 
this area. Despite its inconsistent application, the presump-
tion against extraterritorial application may bridle Article 
III courts’ authority of applying domestic law to foreign con-
duct.  Notably, a complicated test of displacing the presump-
tion has emerged from the recent Supreme Court case of Ki-
obel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., which concerned foreign 
conduct under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). The test states 
the presumption is overcome if the foreign conduct “touches 
and concerns” the United States with sufficient force.  This 
paper further analyzes the touch and concern test, which 
provokes residency, citizenship, and jurisdictional consider-
ations.  These considerations expand beyond ATS litigation 
for guiding litigants and courts on when the presumption 
may be displaced to apply domestic laws to foreign conduct.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
With great power comes great responsibility.1 Or does it? Im-
proved methods of travel, communication, and technology have af-
forded greater ease in taking business and/or leisure international 
within the last century. This power of globalization is widespread 
and inevitable. Yet as people and business become increasingly in-
ternational, consequences for misconduct abroad become increas-
ingly difficult to remedy. Whether United States law may hold a 
person or corporation responsible in federal courts for conduct 
abroad is unpredictable, which suggests that the more people and 
business expand internationally, the less likely they will be account-
able in the United States for conduct that occurs abroad. 
Over the last century, Article III courts have variously expanded 
and contracted their role in addressing these matters, mostly contin-
gent upon the court’s interpretation or disregard of a doctrine re-
ferred to as the presumption against extraterritorial application.2 The 
presumption against extraterritorial application is a canon of statu-
tory interpretation that assumes domestic law does not apply beyond 
the United States, unless the operative statute explicitly calls for ap-
plication beyond domestic conduct.3 The extension of people and 
business all over the world has intensified the need to understand 
when domestic statutes may be applied to foreign conduct that di-
rectly or tangentially affect the United States.4 
Jurisprudence concerning the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) pro-
vides an interesting lens through which federal statutes or common 
law can guide foreign conduct in federal courts. The ATS is a thirty-
three word jurisdictional statute that remained dormant for close to 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Stan Lee & Steve Ditko, Spider-Man!, AMAZING FANTASY #15, Aug. 
1962, at 13. 
 2 See infra Part I; see generally Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach 
to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011) (offering a theoretical approach 
while contemplating the interaction of congressional powers to legislate extrater-
ritoriality and international law). 
 3 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 4 See also F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-
65 (2004) (stating the Supreme Court ordinarily construes statutes to avoid inter-
fering with other nations’ sovereign interests, which is “needed in today’s highly 
interdependent commercial world”). 
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two centuries.5 The ATS was enacted as section 9 of the Judiciary 
Act of 17896 and was not heavily utilized until it was resurrected in 
1980 through the Second Circuit opinion of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.7 
It is the only statute of its kind in the world because it provides 
noncitizens a civil remedy in United States courts for violations of 
“the law of nations” or “a treaty of the United States.”8 
In the seminal case of Filartiga, a Paraguayan family brought 
suit in a United States federal court against a Paraguayan military 
official for torturing their son in Paraguay.9 The Second Circuit 
found that the “deliberate torture perpetrated under the color of of-
ficial authority violate(d) universally accepted norms of the interna-
tional law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the par-
ties.”10 Filartiga thus opened the ATS as an avenue for human rights 
redress in federal courts.11 
While the Second Circuit’s opinion in Filartiga effectively al-
lowed the ATS to be utilized as a vehicle for human rights litigation 
in federal courts, the recent Supreme Court decision of Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. might have obstructed it.12 In 2013, Ki-
obel, a subsequent Supreme Court ATS case, yielded a case study 
of complicated questions that accompany widespread transnational 
                                                                                                             
 5 The statute states, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 6 See generally Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (describing two incidents that 
prompted the passage of the Alien Tort Statute). 
 7 See Rachel Paul, Note & Comment, Interpreting Liability Under the Alien 
Tort Statute, 67 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 705, 706 (2013); Anne-Marie Burley, The Al-
ien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 461, 461 (1989). 
 8 Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law, FOREIGN AFF. 
(Mar./Apr. 2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138810/pierre-n-
leval/the-long-arm-of-international-law (“[T]he United States remains the only 
country in the world to entertain such lawsuits.”). 
 9 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 10 Id. 
 11 See Ismael Diaz, Comment, A Critique of Proposals to Amend the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act to Allow Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns for Human 
Rights Violations, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 137, 141 n.19 (2001). 
 12 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659; discussion infra 
Part III. 
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interactions, such as the weight of the presumption against extrater-
ritorial application and its reach into different areas of law.13 Unlike 
Filartiga, Kiobel involved United States residents and multi-na-
tional corporations that had a presence in the United States. 
More specifically, Kiobel concerned United States residents who 
brought claims under the ATS against foreign corporations for al-
leged conduct that occurred in Nigeria.14 The Court applied the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application, which inhibits domes-
tic statutes from guiding foreign conduct.15 Although the defendants 
were corporations that had a presence in the United States and the 
plaintiffs were United States residents, “mere corporate presence” 
and plaintiff’s legal residency status was not enough to rebut the 
presumption.16 Because the presumption applied and other factors 
could not overcome it, the ATS claims for the alleged foreign con-
duct were dismissed.17 
Kiobel’s application of the presumption relied primarily on Mor-
rison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., a 2010 Supreme Court deci-
sion concerning securities.18 Morrison explains that the presumption 
against extraterritorial application may be displaced if the alleged 
conduct was focused on a federal “congressional concern.”19 Lower 
courts have also relied on Morrison to explain extraterritorial appli-
cation of statutes in other contexts, such as antitrust, Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), and Lanham Act 
claims.20 
The application of Morrison, a “foreign-cubed” securities case, 
in a variety of unrelated subject areas is telling of the importance of 
understanding when domestic statutes can be applied to conduct that 
occurred abroad—a crucial role of United States federal courts. This 
note will evaluate the relationship between Kiobel and Morrison, the 
                                                                                                             
 13 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
 14 See id. at 1662. 
 15 See id. at 1669. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 1664-67, 1669; Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 
(2010). Interestingly, Morrison is referred to as “foreign-cubed” due to the pres-
ence of three indicators: foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and conduct occur-
ring outside of the United States, which is akin to the factors present in Filartiga. 
 19 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266; see discussion infra Part I.B. 
 20 See discussion infra Part I.B.ii. 
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impact Kiobel has on the presumption against extraterritorial appli-
cation jurisprudence, and the reach Kiobel may have into other areas 
of the law. Part I offers a general background to the presumption 
against extraterritorial application and how its temperamental his-
tory may guide courts today to determine if the presumption should 
apply to any number of statutes.21 Part I also details the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the presumption against extraterritorial ap-
plication within the last five years through Morrison, which has res-
urrected a strong presumption against extraterritorial application, 
and Kiobel.22 Part II further explores Kiobel’s presumption “test” 
and the factors the majority and concurrences evaluate in applying 
the presumption against extraterritorial application to the ATS.23 
Part III discusses the effect Kiobel may have on the presumption as 
whole, while examining residency and citizenship considerations of 
the plaintiff or defendant and jurisdictional considerations.24 
II.   PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated in a 1909 antitrust 
case, “the general and almost universal rule is that the character of 
an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law 
of the country where the act is done.”25 Justice Holmes further out-
lined that without a clear mandate by Congress, courts must confine 
the statute being interpreted to the “territorial limits over which the 
lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”26 This interpretation 
                                                                                                             
 21 See infra Part I. 
 22 See infra Part I.B. 
 23 See infra Part II. 
 24 See infra Part III. 
 25 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (citing 
Slater v. Mexican Nat’l. R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904)). The Sherman Act 
has expanded extraterritorial reach under United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945) and Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 
549 F.2d 597 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 26 Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. 
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presents a rigid origination of the presumption against extraterrito-
rial application, which has since been modified to allow for some 
extraterritorial application.27 
In general, the presumption against extraterritorial application 
pertains to domestic statutes when used to govern foreign conduct 
to estop cases from being tried in United States federal courts.28 The 
concept derives from the understanding that Congress creates laws 
with respect to domestic, and not foreign, affairs29 and comity.30 The 
most appropriate form of comity may be labeled as “prescriptive 
comity,” which Justice Scalia describes, in his dissent in Hartford 
Fire Insurance Company v. California, as “the respect sovereign na-
tions afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws.”31 
                                                                                                             
 27 Accord Jonathan Turley, Legal Theory, “When in Rome”: Multinational 
Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U.L. REV. 
598, 604, 608 (1990). 
 28 See generally William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 (1998) [hereinafter Dodge, 
Understanding the Presumption]. 
 29 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (citing 
Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)); accord Foley Bros., Inc. 
v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); see also Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 357 
(“All legislation is prima facie territorial.”) (quotation omitted). 
 30 See Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356. American Banana’s holding was 
substantially overturned by Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 
U.S. 690 (1962); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 
Stat. 1074, as recognized in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (“[The 
presumption] serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and 
those of other nations which could result in international discord.”); see generally 
John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 
351, 362-66 (2010) (describing early cases adopting American Banana’s pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality generally involved situations that were un-
likely to cause conflicting jurisdictional claims by more than one country). 
 31 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1987). 
Note that Hartford’s majority opinion did not elicit the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality. Instead, Justice Scalia’s dissent took it upon itself to conclude the 
presumption was not at issue because of case law that held the Sherman Act did 
not invoke the presumption. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 814; see generally Stephen D. 
Piraino, Note, A Prescription for Excess: Using Prescriptive Comity to Limit the 
Extraterritorial Reach of the Sherman Act, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1099 (2012) (de-
scribing the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial application). 
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Moreover, the presumption serves as a restriction for the judicial 
branch.32 To maintain each branch of the government separation of 
the powers, the Supreme Court has expressed the need to avoid any 
interpretation of federal law that may have foreign policy conse-
quences.33 The presumption against extraterritorial application par-
ticularly inhibits situations not clearly outlined by the political 
branches.34 
A. Brief Background 
The application of the presumption to various statutes has 
proven inconsistent, but it is “an essential part of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence.”35 The inconsistency may largely result from 
its temperamental history.36 This brief background will use case ex-
amples to highlight the presumption’s interesting history, highlight 
jurisdictional questions that accompany foreign conduct, and com-
pare the presumption’s application on criminal statutes. 
                                                                                                             
 32 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013); see 
also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam) (Bork, J., concurring) (“[S]eparation of powers principles . . . caution 
courts to avoid potential interference with the political branches’ conduct of for-
eign relations.”). 
 33 See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of 
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 551 (1997). 
 34 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Socieded Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 
U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) (“[T]he arguments should be directed to the Congress rather 
than to us.”); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“The presumption against extraterritori-
ality guards against our courts triggering such serious foreign policy conse-
quences, and instead defers such decisions, quite appropriately, to the political 
branches.”); see also, Bradley, supra note 33, at 516 (“As part of [the] division of 
power, the Constitution assigns principal policymaking authority, as well as prin-
cipal authority over foreign affairs, to the legislative and executive branches rather 
than to the judicial branch.”). 
 35 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting); see generally John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. L. REV. 635, 640 (2011). 
 36 See generally Dodge, Understanding the Presumption, supra note 28, at 
352-53; see also William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
After Morrison, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 396, 396 (2011) [hereinafter 
Dodge, After Morrison] (“The Supreme Court’s recent extraterritoriality jurispru-
dence has been a mess.”). 
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In 1991, the Supreme Court opinion in Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Company (“Ar-
amco”) compared varying precedent and set a strict application of 
the presumption.37 The Supreme Court applied the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in a Title VII employment discrimination 
suit brought by an American citizen against an American company 
for conduct that occurred abroad.38 The Court in Aramco found the 
presumption was not displaced on the basis that Congress has pre-
viously articulated the desire of extraterritorial application of a stat-
ute, and it did not do so when it enacted the Title VII statute.39 
Aramco cited the Lanham Act as an example of a statute that 
Congress intentionally gave extraterritorial reach. 40 In Steele v. 
Bulova Watch Co., the Supreme Court analyzed whether the Lan-
ham Act, which was enacted to prevent the deceptive use of trade-
marks, reached alleged unlawful conduct by a United States citizen 
outside of the United States.41 Because the unlawful conduct had an 
impact on the United States and the language of the statute gave 
“broad jurisdictional grant” and “sweeping reach into all commerce 
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,”42 the Supreme Court 
found that Congress intended the statute to have extraterritorial ap-
plication.43 
Conversely, Aramco analyzed two cases that found the respec-
tive statutes did not apply to foreign conduct.  First, the Aramco 
Court analyzed the Federal Employers’ Liability Act44 in the Su-
preme Court decision of New York Central Railroad Co. v. 
Chisholm.45 In relation to the liability of railroad companies, the 
                                                                                                             
 37 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 258. 
 40 Id. at 252-53; see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); but see Bradley, supra note 33, 
at 527-28 (criticizing the reasoning the Lanham Act was found to have extraterri-
torial reach). 
 41 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 252 (citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 
344 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1952)). 
 42 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 252 (citing Steele, 344 U.S. at 286-87); 
compare 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining commerce as “all commerce which 
may lawfully be regulated by Congress”) with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating 
Congress shall have the power to regulate “[c]ommerce with foreign Nations”). 
 43 See Steele, 344 U.S. at 286-87. 
 44 Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2012). 
 45 New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29 (1925). 
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statute addressed negligent injuries incurred by employees engaging 
in commerce between “any of the States or Territories and any for-
eign nation or nations . . . .”46 Although the claim at issue in the case 
was filed by the estate of an American citizen against an American 
carrier for conduct that occurred thirty miles away from the United 
States in Canada, the Court found no language in the statute to war-
rant an extraterritorial application.47 Thus, the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act could not be applied to conduct that occurred abroad.48 
Second, the Aramco Court considered the National Labor Rela-
tions Act49 in the Supreme Court decision of McCulloch v. Sociedad 
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras.50 Although the National La-
bor Relations Act’s definition of commerce included “between any 
foreign country,” the broad language did not specify an extraterrito-
rial effect.51 This example, along with Chisholm’s analysis of the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act, supported the following strong 
presumption: without express language to indicate extraterritorial 
reach, there is none.52 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice Ste-
vens, austerely opposed the majority’s strict statutory interpreta-
tion.53 The dissent countered that the presumption is not a “clear 
statement” rule; instead, courts should consider all factors of legis-
lative intent.54 More specifically, Justice Marshall reasoned that 
Congress intended Title VII to protect United States citizens from 
discrimination by United States employers abroad.55 
                                                                                                             
 46 45 U.S.C. § 51. 
 47 Chisholm, 268 U.S. at 30-31. 
 48 Id. at 31. 
 49 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012). 
 50 McCulloch v. Socieded Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 
(1963). 
 51 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1991) (citing 
McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19). 
 52 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 251-52; see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication 
of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”); but see Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 
U.S. at 263-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 53 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, at 260 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 54 Id. at 261. 
 55 Id. 
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Apart from Aramco’s strict application of the presumption for 
Title VII employment discrimination,56 exceptions have been re-
moved from the grasp of the presumption for other statutes, such as 
criminal statutes.57 The seminal case of United States v. Bowman 
articulated that the presumption does not apply to criminal statutes 
because criminal statutes are “not logically dependent on their lo-
cality for the government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of 
the right of the government to defend itself against obstruction, or 
fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citi-
zens, officers, or agents.”58 
Both Aramco and Bowman reveal when the presumption against 
extraterritorial application may be overcome to allow application of 
a domestic statute to foreign conduct; although, some courts simply 
do not apply the presumption at all.59 This is likely to change in the 
twenty-first century because the Supreme Court has addressed the 
presumption against extraterritorial application more definitively 
than it has in the past in two distinct areas of law.60 
For example, in 2010, the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Na-
tional Australia Bank Ltd. invigorated the presumption in a securi-
ties regulation case.61 Morrison has had widespread effects on the 
overall canon of the presumption against extraterritoriality.62 Three 
                                                                                                             
 56 Notably, Congress responded to Aramco by enacting the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 to give Title VII specified extraterritorial reach. See Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012)). 
 57 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922); United States v. 
Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 
87-88 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Ali, 885 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2012); but see David 
Keenan & Sabrina P. Shroff, Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Seriously in Criminal Cases After Morrison and Kiobel, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 
80-87 (2013). 
 58 Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. 
 59 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying a 
domestic statute to foreign conduct without applying the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality). 
 60 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 278-80 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., concurrence); see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 
439 (2007). 
 61 See Morrison, 561 U.S. 247. 
 62 See generally Dodge, After Morrison, supra note 36. 
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years later, the Supreme Court depended heavily on Morrison to ad-
dress the presumption against extraterritorial application in Kiobel, 
a human rights case.63 Exploring the effect of both these cases is an 
important indication of the future application of the presumption to 
various areas of law. 
B. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.’s Presumption 
The alleged fraud in Morrison resulted from National Australia 
Bank’s purchase of a mortgage serving company that was headquar-
tered in Florida.64 The plaintiffs argued that because the fraud hap-
pened in Florida, United States securities laws should apply, specif-
ically section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.65 Conversely, the respond-
ents asserted that because the fraud related to trading in Australian 
securities, United States securities law should not apply.66 
The Second Circuit found that because it is not clear from the 
language of the Exchange Act if it has an extraterritorial application, 
the court must “discern” whether Congress would want the statute 
to apply through a “conduct” test, “effects” test, or a combination of 
the two tests.67 The conduct test asks “whether the wrongful conduct 
occurred in the United States,” and the effects test asks “whether the 
wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or 
upon United States citizens.”68 The Second Circuit specifically con-
cluded the conduct test was necessary to assess whether there was 
sufficient United States involvement for federal court jurisdiction.69 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion took a different approach.70  
The opinion criticized the Second Circuit’s “disregard” of the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality in federal securities cases and 
quashed the suggestion that extraterritorial reach is a question of 
subject-matter jurisdiction by defining the scope as a question of 
                                                                                                             
 63 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 64 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 250-51. 
 65 See id. at 252-53. 
 66 See id. at 253. 
 67 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 68 Id. (citing SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003)); see Psi-
menos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 69 See id. Morrison, 547 F.3d at 171 (citing Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 
F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 70 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 249. 
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merits.71 Under the issue of merits, the Court determined that be-
cause the focus of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is not on 
where the wrong began but upon the purchases and sales of securi-
ties on domestic soil, section 10(b) applies only to the transactions 
of securities listed on domestic exchanges.72 The opinion bluntly 
stated, “When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.”73 
The opinion determined that the focus in interpreting the extra-
territorial application of statutes is not on where the prohibited con-
duct occurred, but where the conduct effects.74 Morrison therefore 
shifts the analysis “from the location of the conduct to the location 
of the effects.”75 Therefore, although the location of the conduct, as 
plaintiffs emphasize, is in Florida, the Court noted the rarity of a 
situation where a statute is prohibited extraterritorial application that 
does not have any contact at all with the United States. 76 “[The pre-
sumption] would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its 
kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”77 
Therefore, Morrison sought to eliminate concerns of the “contact 
test,” and instead, emphasize the “effect test.”78 
1. Justice Stevens’ Concurrence 
Justice Stevens concurred in judgment, but differed in reason-
ing.79 He wrote a separate concurrence to identify a possible unin-
tended outcome of the majority’s holding and characterize the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application differently.80 The con-
currence highlights that as a result of the majority’s holding, Amer-
                                                                                                             
 71 Id. at 248. 
 72 Id. at 249; accord Dodge, Understanding the Presumption, supra note 28. 
 73 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 248. 
 74 See Dodge, After Morrison, supra note 36, at 397 (citing William S. Dodge, 
Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687 (2011)). 
 75 See Dodge, After Morrison, supra note 36, at 399. 
 76 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 249. 
 77 See id. at 266. 
 78 See Dodge, After Morrison, supra note 36, at 397 (citing William S. Dodge, 
Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687 (2011)). 
 79 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 274 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 80 See id. 
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icans who bought shares on foreign exchanges cannot sue under fed-
eral securities laws.81 Consequently, the focus of the Exchange Act 
is on the purchases and sales of securities in domestic markets re-
gardless of the effect of any fraud suffered at home.82 
Justice Stevens’ portrayal of the presumption against extraterri-
torial application also differs from the majority’s depiction.83  The 
concurrence refers to the presumption as a “flexible rule of thumb” 
that the court turns into “something more like a clear statement 
rule.”84 He emphasizes that the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity serves “as a theory of congressional purpose, a tool for managing 
international conflict, a background norm, a tiebreaker.”85 
2. Morrison’s Effect 
The effect of Morrison is evident in cases extending well beyond 
securities fraud.  Defendants have utilized the stringent application 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality in areas of law such as 
                                                                                                             
 81 See id. at 285. 
 82 See id. at 284. 
 83 See id. at 278. 
 84 Id.. 
 85 See id. at 280. 
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the Lanham Act,86 Sherman Act,87 RICO Act,88 Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act,89 and ATS.90 Although some scholars warn against ex-
tending this securities-related case to other areas of law,91 the differ-
ence in substantive law has not stopped courts around the country 
from utilizing Morrison to explain and/or apply the presumption in 
other arenas.92 This is not surprising given Morrison’s reliance on 
precedent unrelated to securities regulation and its direct language 
that states, “we apply the presumption in all cases . . . .”93 For ex-
ample, the Court frequently cites Aramco, an employment law case 
                                                                                                             
 86 See, e.g., Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 
2010) (comparing the Lanham Act to the Exchange Act in determining how Mor-
rison affects the statute). 
 87 See, e.g., Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (examining how Morrison interplays with the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1982, which was meant to limit the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Sherman Act). 
 88 See, e.g., Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 
2010) (per curiam) (stating RICO does not apply extraterritorially without delving 
into the purpose of the statute); see generally Gideon Mark, RICO’s Extraterrito-
riality, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 543 (2013). 
 89 See, e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010) (justifying 
the Torture Victim Protection Act’s extraterritorial application by analyzing Mor-
rison). 
 90 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) 
(using Morrison’s strict application of the presumption). 
 91 See David He, Beyond Securities Fraud: The Territorial Reach of U.S. 
Laws After Morrison v. N.A.B., 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 148, 202-205 (2013) 
(“[W]hile defendants have been eager to expand the bounds of Morrison, attempts 
by the courts to limit other U.S. laws through the strict presumption against extra-
territoriality, and to fit wholly different scenarios under Morrison’s transaction-
based approach, have resulted in even great inconsistency and uncertainty.”); 
Austen L. Parrish, Morrison, the Effects Test, and the Presumption Against Ex-
traterritoriality: A Reply to Professor Dodge, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 399 
(2011). 
 92 Some scholars suggest Morrison can be extended to limit Bowman’s lib-
eral interpretation of the presumption in criminal cases. See, e.g., Zachary D. 
Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law 
After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 
181 (2011) (“A court looking at an ambiguous criminal statute may treat Morrison 
as the straw that broke Bowman’s back, requiring a stringent presumption in crim-
inal as well as civil cases.”). 
 93 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010). 
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concerning extraterritorial application, to justify applying the pre-
sumption in this securities case.94 The Supreme Court has also relied 
heavily on Morrison recently to extend the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application to the recent opinion of Kiobel, relating to 
the ATS.95 
III.   INTERPRETING KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.’S 
PRESUMPTION  
Kiobel’s effect on the overall application of the presumption 
against extraterritorial application will depend on whether subse-
quent courts will utilize the presumption as a strict rule statement 
against applying domestic statutes to foreign conduct, look to the 
structure, purpose, and legislative intent of the statute to examine if 
the presumption may be overcome, or some combination of the two.  
Evaluating this recent decision may provide guidance on applying 
the Alien Tort Statute and beyond. 
In Kiobel,96 Nigerians residing in the United States brought 
claims under the Alien Tort Statute97 against foreign corporations 
                                                                                                             
 94 See, e.g., id. at 269 (“[W]e reject the notion that the Exchange Act reaches 
conduct in this country affecting exchanges or transactions abroad for the same 
reason that Aramco rejected overseas application of Title VII to all domestically 
concluded employment contracts . . . with American employers.”). 
 95 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
 96 The original question before the court concerned corporate liability, which 
was changed six days after oral arguments for more briefing and oral argument 
on a new question, “whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of 
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012). 
Some scholars believe because the Court did not explicitly state there is no cor-
porate liability, such liability exists. See, e.g., Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence 
of Things Not Seen: Divining Balancing Factors From Kiobel’s “Touch and Con-
cern” Test, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 443, 448 (2015). 
 97 Claims brought under the ATS are required to show the relevant interna-
tional law is specific and universally respected. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
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alleging that the corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian gov-
ernment in committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.98 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a five-Justice majority, found that 
claims under the ATS are not intended to have extraterritorial 
reach.99 Any claim brought under the jurisdiction of the ATS has a 
presumption against extraterritorial application, which restricts fed-
eral courts from applying domestic law to violations committed out-
side of the United States.100  The majority explains that the presump-
tion serves an important role in preventing judicial interference in 
foreign policy.101 
The Court states that the presumption may be displaced, or 
would not apply, if the claims touch and concern the United States 
“with sufficient force.”102 Because all the relevant conduct occurred 
outside of the United States and mere corporate presence by the de-
fendants in the United States is not a sufficient force to displace the 
presumption,103 the court barred the ATS claims.104 In the analysis 
below, Part II examines Kiobel’s touch and concern test and looks 
to the concurrences for further guidance. 
A. Touch and Concern Test 
To overcome the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion, Kiobel notes several different methods in analyzing the statute 
in question.105 First, Chief Justice Roberts reiterates that generic 
                                                                                                             
 98 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662-63. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged 
the corporations provided “Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and com-
pensations, as well as allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’ property 
as a staging ground for attacks.” Id. 
 99 See id. at 1669. 
 100 See id. Although scholars question if the Kiobel plaintiffs were actually 
asking a federal court to apply international law extraterritorially, which may not 
call for the presumption against extraterritoriality. See David L. Sloss, Kiobel and 
Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without a Rationale, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 241, 243 
(2013). 
 101 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664-65; see Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 
187 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 102 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 103 See id. (“Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would 
reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to 
determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.”). 
 104 See id. 
 105 See id. at 1664. 
SUMMER 2016]   APPLYING DOMESTIC STATUTES TO FOREIGN CONDUCT 371 
 
terms such as “any” or “every” found in the language of a statute 
does not historically indicate an extraterritorial effect that is suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption.106 Second, the context of the stat-
ute—such as the historical background of the statute in question—
is a relevant inquiry.107 The Court also follows Morrison in stressing 
that a statute carries its own private right of action and only applies 
extraterritorially with a “clear indication” from Congress.108 
More importantly, a notable takeaway from Kiobel is the “test” 
the Court implemented for determining when the presumption 
against extraterritoriality can be displaced: 
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place 
outside the United States.  And even where the 
claims touch and concern the territory of the United 
States, they must do so with sufficient force to dis-
place the presumption against extraterritorial appli-
cation.109 
This test does not allude to the specific “conduct” or “effects” 
test that was discussed in detail in the Morrison decision.110 Instead, 
if the claim touches and concerns the United States with sufficient 
force, the presumption may be overcome.111 Yet the terms “touches 
                                                                                                             
 106 See id. at 1665 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 
262 (2010); Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005); EEOC v. Arabian 
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-50 (1991); and Foley Bros., Inc. v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 336 U.S. 281, 287 (1949)).; accord United States v. Palmer, 16 
U.S. 610, 632-33 (1818). 
 107 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666. 
 108 Id. at 1665 (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265); contra Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the ATS does not have ex-
traterritorial reach by distinguishing from Morrison). 
 109 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264-69); but see 
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190, 190 n.25 (2d. Cir. 2013) (emphasiz-
ing that if all relevant conduct occurred outside the United States, the claim is 
barred under the ATS and the touch and concern analysis was stated in dicta). 
 110 Compare Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 with Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257-60 
(discussing the Second Circuit’s conduct and effects test). 
 111 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
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and concerns” and “sufficient force” remain undefined and inher-
ently vague; the concurrences attempt to provide further insight.112 
B. Concurrences 
The test provided in Chief Justice Robert’s opinion “obviously 
leaves much unanswered,” as noted by a concurrence by Justice 
Alito, joined by Justice Thomas.113 Justice Alito’s concurrence re-
fers to the touch and concern test as “a broader standard” in which a 
cause of action under the ATS may overcome the presumption.114 
More specifically, the domestic conduct involved needs to be 
enough “to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa’s 
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized na-
tions.”115 This stems from the determination that Sosa’s require-
ments of definiteness and acceptance is Congress’ focus under the 
ATS.116 
Justice Kennedy also joined the majority and wrote a separate 
concurring opinion to expand on the reach and interpretation of the 
ATS.117 He signed onto the majority’s framework, but noted a criti-
cal weakness.118 Justice Kennedy highlighted the potential for suits 
to arise related to human rights violations that are not covered by the 
majority’s framework, yet may require a further inquiry into the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application.119 Overall, the concur-
rence serves as notice that the majority left “open a number of sig-
nificant questions” concerning the ATS’s relationship with the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application.120 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Ka-
gan, wrote separately to reject the application of the ATS to the 
                                                                                                             
 112 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1669-70 
(Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1670-78 (Breyer, concurring); discussion infra Part 
III.C.i. 
 113 Id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial appli-
cation may require some further elaboration and explanation.”). 
 114 Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
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plaintiffs’ claims, but articulated a different analytical framework 
for consideration.121 First, Justice Breyer’s concurrence bluntly 
found that he would not apply the presumption against extraterrito-
riality.122 Instead, the concurrence advocates for a nexus require-
ment where a suit can be brought in federal court if “(1) the alleged 
tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American na-
tional, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely af-
fects an important American interest.”123 He further elaborates that 
the third prong includes the interest of preventing the United States 
from being a safe harbor for “a torturer or other common enemy of 
mankind.”124 Unlike the majority opinion or Morrison, Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence does not decide whether the application of the 
presumption is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction or question of 
merits.125 
IV.   KIOBEL IN APPLICATION  
As Kiobel’s concurrences note, there are several questions left 
open for lower courts to interpret the Kiobel decision, such as the 
vague touch and concern test.126 Notwithstanding, lower courts have 
followed a strict application of the presumption to foreclose 
Filartiga-type cases under the ATS, which was a concern high-
lighted in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.127 Critics of Kiobel argue 
                                                                                                             
 121 Id. at 1670-71 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 122 Id. at 1671. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id.; see also Katie Shay, 224 Years After the Judiciary Act, the U.S. Must 
Not Become a Safe Haven to Modern Pirates, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 26, 2013, 
11:56 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katie-shay/alien-tort-stat-
ute_b_3988787.html. 
 125 Compare Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (ignoring any subject matter jurisdic-
tion or merits question) with id. at 1665 (Roberts, C.J.) (treating the issue as a 
question of merits); see also Paul L. Hoffman, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co.: First Impressions, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 28, 38 n.45 (2013) (“It is 
not clear whether Justice Breyer views the application of the presumption as an 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction or a merits question.”). 
 126 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1669 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
 127 See id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler 
AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[I]f all the relevant conduct occurred 
abroad, that is simply the end of the mater under Kiobel.”). 
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the Supreme Court disregarded decades of ATS case law that was 
set forth since the statute’s revival in Filartiga.128 
Yet, there may be a silver lining for victims of human rights 
abuses looking to bring their suits in the United States, albeit a lim-
ited one. Suits involving extrajudicial killing and torture under the 
ATS are asserting viable causes of action for extrajudicial killing129 
and torture130 under the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”).131 
The ATS and TVPA share the same purpose, location within the 
United States Code, statute of limitations, and civil suit mechanism, 
but differ in their jurisdictional bases and causes of actions.132  More 
specifically, both statutes provide remedies for extrajudicial killing 
and torture, but the TVPA likely survives Kiobel’s strict application 
of the presumption because it was explicitly enacted to “provid[e] a 
civil cause of action in U.S. courts for torture committed abroad.”133 
                                                                                                             
 128 See He, supra note 91, at 193-94; see also William S. Dodge, Alien Tort 
Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1577, 1587 (2014) 
[hereinafter Dodge, Road Not Taken] (“Although that presumption against extra-
territoriality has a long history in American law, by the time Filartiga was decided 
it had largely fallen out of use.”); see generally Dodge, Understanding the Pre-
sumption, supra note 28, at 85-86. 
 129 See Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 § 3(a) 
(1992) (definition of extrajudicial killing). 
 130 See id. at § 3(b) (definition of torture). 
 131 See Jaramillo v. Naranjo, No. 10-21951-CIV, 2014 WL 4898210, at *1 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2014) (dismissing ATS claim, but finding plaintiffs stated 
claims under the TVPA); Mamani v. Berzain, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1365-73 (S.D. 
Fla. 2014) (finding no relief under the ATS against a former Bolivian President 
living in the United States, but plaintiffs have stated claims under the TVPA); but 
see Hoffman, supra note 125, at 47 (“The Filartiga line of cases against individual 
defendants found in the United States should survive the new presumption.”). 
 132 See Jaramillo, 2014 WL 4898210, at *9 (citing Papa v. Unites States, 281 
F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) and Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 
1153 (11th Cir. 2005)); compare Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012), 
with Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350)). 
 133 S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 4 (1991); see generally Chowdhury v. Worldtel 
Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2014) (analyzing the TVPA to have 
extraterritorial application), cert. denied sub nom. Khan v. Chowdhury, 135 S. Ct. 
401 (2014); see also Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 602 (11th Cir. 
2015) (“Although the text of the TVPA along is sufficient to illustrate the Act’s 
intended extraterritoriality, the legislature history fully supports this conclu-
sion.”); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (“Many serious concerns with respect to human rights abuses 
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Part III further discusses Kiobel’s effect on ATS litigation, while 
highlighting two other noteworthy areas: first, residency and citi-
zenship considerations as discussed by Justice Breyer’s concur-
rence;134 and second, jurisdictional considerations because the ATS 
is a jurisdictional statute.135 
A. Residency and Citizenship Considerations 
As previously mentioned, Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Ki-
obel would not apply the presumption, but would consider residency 
and citizenship as factors in finding jurisdiction.136  Although the 
plaintiffs in Kiobel were United States residents and the defendants 
had corporate presence in the United States, the majority rejected 
whether residency and citizenship played into overcoming the pre-
sumption by finding that defendants’ mere corporate presence in the 
United States was not enough to displace the presumption.137 The 
Court declared that “[c]orporations are often present in many coun-
tries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence 
suffices.”138 Therefore, just because the defendant also operated in 
the United States, this was not enough to displace the presump-
tion.139 Yet, the Court failed to give an indication of what residency 
or citizenship considerations are needed to displace the presump-
tion, leaving open if this fits into the “touch and concern” inquiry.140 
Not surprisingly, courts have differed over the application or dis-
placement of the presumption based on the citizenship status of the 
plaintiff or defendant.141 
                                                                                                             
committed abroad have been addressed by Congress in statutes such as the Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991 . . . .”). 
 134 See discussion infra Part III.A. Justice Stevens also warned about these 
considerations in his Morrison concurrence. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank 
Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 274-86 (2010). 
 135 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 136 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 137 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Compare Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 n.24 (2d Cir. 2013), 
with Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 323-24 (D. Mass. 
2013). 
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The plaintiffs in the Second Circuit case of Balintulo v. Daimler 
AG read Kiobel as allowing claims based on foreign conduct when 
the defendants are citizens or residents of the United States or where 
the defendants’ conduct affects a United States interest.142 The court 
said, “Nothing in the Court’s reasoning in Kiobel suggests that the 
rule of law it applied somehow depends on a defendant’s citizen-
ship.”143 It foreclosed the ATS claim in Balintulo while emphasizing 
that if the conduct in question occurred outside of the United States, 
“that is simply the end of the matter under Kiobel.”144 Additionally, 
the analysis of whether the conduct touches or concerns the United 
States in Kiobel is merely dicta that is to be explored only if some 
relevant conduct occurs in the United States.145 
A year later, the plaintiffs in the Eleventh Circuit case of Car-
dona v. Chiquita Brands International also tried to displace the pre-
sumption because the defendant, Chiquita Brands International, is a 
United States corporation.146 The Eleventh Circuit responded, like 
the Second Circuit, by rejecting corporate citizenship as disposi-
tive.147 The court stated the difference between corporate presence 
and corporate citizenship does not change Congress’ intent in 
whether the statute applies to torts extraterritoriality—the relevant 
conduct, the alleged torts, occurred outside of the United States, thus 
barring suit under the presumption.148 
                                                                                                             
 142 See Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 189-90. 
 143 See Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 190 n.24; see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
654 F.3d 11, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The presumption against extraterritoriality is 
focused on the site of the conduct, not the identity of the defendant.”). 
 144 See Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 190. 
 145 See id.; see also Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 190 n.26 (“Like the Supreme Court, 
we have no reason to address how much conduct must occur in the United States 
because all the relevant conduct that purportedly violated the law of nations in 
this case is alleged to have occurred on the territory of a foreign sovereign.”). 
 146 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
 147 See id. 
 148 See id.; but see Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains 
Open to “Foreign Squared” Cases, SCOTUS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-
open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ (“Robert’s assertion [in Kiobel] that ‘[c]orpora-
tions are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that 
mere corporate presence suffices,’ might indicate that U.S. corporations could, in 
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Interestingly, Judge Martin’s dissent in Cardona would have 
found Chiquita Brands International’s United States corporate citi-
zenship as at least one of two reasons to displace the presumption.149 
Judge Martin points to “a fundamental principle of international law 
that every State has the sovereign authority to regulate the conduct 
of its own citizens, regardless of whether that conduct occurs inside 
or outside of the State’s territory.”150 Furthermore, she distinguishes 
between offenses seeking relief in a United States court that occur 
on foreign soil by a foreign defendant with the situation in Cardona 
that, in her view, involved sufficient contact on United States soil 
by a United States corporation.151 
Other courts have considered litigant residency and/or citizen-
ship for displacing the presumption.152 For example, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the ATS claims in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech-
nology touched and concerned the United States with sufficient 
force to displace the presumption, in part, because of the defendant’s 
status as a United States corporation and the defendant’s employees’ 
status as United States citizens, on whose conduct the ATS claims 
were based.153 In Al Shimari, however, the plaintiffs pled other fac-
tors to warrant sufficient United States contact.154 Also, the Eleventh 
                                                                                                             
some cases, be subject to ATS liability for actions committed against foreigners 
abroad.”). 
 149 See Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 150 See id. at 1193. 
 151 See id. at 1195. 
 152 See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 
2014); Ahmad v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 
Aug. 20, 2013); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 321-
23 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 153 See Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530. 
 154 “We conclude the plaintiffs’ ATS claims ‘touch and concern’ the territory 
of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against ex-
traterritorial application based on: (1) CACI’s status as a United States corpora-
tion; (2) the United States citizenship of CACI’s employees, upon whose conduct 
the ATS claims are based; (3) the facts in the record showing that CACI’s contract 
to perform interrogation services in Iraq was issued in the United States by the 
United States Department of the Interior, and that the contract required CACI’s 
employees to obtain security clearances from the United States Department of 
Defense; (4) the allegations that CACI’s managers in the United States gave tacit 
approval to the acts of torture committed by CACI employees at the Abu Ghraib 
prison, attempted to ‘cover up’ the misconduct, and ‘implicitly, if not expressly, 
encouraged’ it; and (5) the expressed intent of Congress, through enactment of the 
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Circuit in Doe v. Drummond Co. expressed that “when an ATS 
claim involves a United States citizen defendant or where events 
underlying the claim occur both domestically and extraterritorially, 
the courts must engage in further analysis.”155  Thus, even if all con-
duct occurred outside of the United States, the courts must engage 
in further analysis if a United States citizen defendant is involved.156 
Overall, several courts read Kiobel as indicating the substantive 
analysis of conduct remains consistent regardless of the residency 
or citizenship of the parties to the claim; residency or citizenship is 
separate from the necessary analysis of conduct that touches and 
concerns the United States.157 Nonetheless, some courts consider lit-
igant residency and/or citizenship as relevant in displacing the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application.158 
B. Jurisdictional Considerations 
Although Kiobel heavily relies on Morrison to explain the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application, the plain distinction 
between the statutory text of Kiobel’s ATS and Morrison’s Securi-
ties Exchange Act is that the ATS confers jurisdiction and does not 
expressly provide for causes of action. The ATS provides that “[t]he 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
                                                                                                             
TVPA and 18 U.S.C § 2340A, to provide aliens access to United States courts and 
to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed 
abroad.” Id. at 530-31. 
 155 Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 586 (emphasis added). 
 156 See id. 
 157 See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 189 (2d Cir. 2014); Logi-
novskaya v. Batratchenko 764 F.3d 266, 273 (2d Cir. 2014); Baloco v. Drummond 
Co., Inc., 767 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 
62, 74 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Mamani v. Berzain, 21 F. Supp. 3d, 1367-68 (S.D. 
Fla. 2014) (“Many courts have found in the wake of Kiobel that a defendant’s 
presence or residence in the United States at the time of the litigation . . . does not 
displace the Kiobel presumption.”); but see Bradley, supra note 33, at 510-511 
(“[I]t is generally accepted that Congress has substantial power to legislate extra-
territoriality, especially with respect to U.S. citizens.”). 
 158 See Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530; Ahmad v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 
2013 WL 4479077, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013); Sexual Minorities Uganda 
v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 321-23 (D. Mass. 2013). 
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or a treaty of the United States.”159 Scholars comment that the in-
corporation of the ATS as a provision of the Judiciary Act is incon-
sistent with the view that the ATS would itself yield causes of action 
because the Judiciary Act focused on the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.160 Yet, “the First Congress did not intend the provision to be 
‘stillborn.’”161 Despite confusion, the ATS grants jurisdiction, and a 
cause of action is generally derived from federal common law for 
international human rights cases.162 The Morrison opinion, in con-
trast, mentions section 27, the jurisdictional provision of the Ex-
change Act; however, the opinion did not apply the presumption to 
section 27.163 This contrasts with the notion that the presumption 
against extraterritorial application is applied to the ATS, a jurisdic-
tional statute. 
The presumption is applicable to substantive statutes, but not 
generally to jurisdictional statutes.164 Professor William Dodge pos-
its that if the presumption against extraterritorial application is ap-
plied to jurisdiction statutes, then suits derived from substantive 
law—like the amended Title VII statute that is clearly intended to 
apply extraterritorially—would have to be dismissed for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The unanimous court in Morrison supports 
                                                                                                             
 159 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 160 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 587, 592-93 (2002); accord Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-
13 (2004). 
 161 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) (quot-
ing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714). 
 162 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724; see also Dodge, Road Not Taken, supra note 
128, at 1577-78; see, e.g., Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (“[I]t is unclear to 
the Court how to apply a ‘touch and concern’ inquiry to a purely jurisdictional 
statute such as the ATS.”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 
1980) (stating the ATS allows a federal forum for international human rights vio-
lations). 
 163 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2010); 15 
U.S.C. § 78aa (2012); see also Dodge, After Morrison, supra note 36, at 399 
(making the distinction that Justice Scalia consciously chose to not apply the pre-
sumption to Section 27). 
 164 See Dodge, After Morrison, supra note 36, at 399; but see Smith v. United 
States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (granting jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act) and Arg. Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) 
(granting jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 
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this interpretation because of its clear distinction in applying the pre-
sumption to substantive, but not jurisdictional, statutes;165 however, 
the Court in Kiobel noted the ATS was “strictly jurisdictional,” and 
proceeded to apply the presumption.166 
Kiobel maintains that in order to overcome the presumption, the 
ATS must “evince a clear indication of extraterritoriality.”167 The 
opinion also directly analyzes the language of the ATS to determine 
if causes of action recognized under the statute have extraterritorial 
reach.168 Although some scholars criticize this confusion,169 a closer 
reading of the decision generally finds the Court applying the pre-
sumption to the cause of action aspect of the ATS, or federal com-
mon law. For example, the majority notes, “[n]othing about this his-
torical context suggests that Congress also intended federal common 
law under the ATS to provide a cause of action for conduct occur-
ring in the territory of another sovereign.”170 
The crux of the jurisdictional considerations is the distinction the 
Court made in Kiobel when it reviewed the true question the Court 
was framing in Sosa: “Sosa is not whether a federal court has juris-
diction to entertain a cause of action provided by foreign or even 
international law.  The question is instead whether the court has au-
thority to recognize a cause of action under U.S. law to enforce a 
norm of international law.”171 The latter question is what triggers the 
presumption against extraterritorial application, and ultimately, that 
is what the Supreme Court in Kiobel was attempting to cure. Be-
cause the Court was focused on the authority to recognize a cause of 
action under federal law, it examined the ATS although it is essen-
tially a jurisdictional statute. 
                                                                                                             
 165 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254; accord Turley supra note 27, at 636 (“The [pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application] was designed to determine subject 
matter jurisdiction, but did so by reference to prescriptive jurisdiction princi-
ples.”) 
 166 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
 167 Id. at 1665 (citation omitted). 
 168 Id. 
 169 See generally Anthony Colangelo, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: Kiobel Con-
tradicts Morrison, OPINIO JURIS (May 10, 2013, 9:00 AM) http://opinioju-
ris.org/2013/05/10/kiobel-insta-symposium-kiobel-contradicts-morrison/. 
 170 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668-69. 
 171 Id. at 1661. 
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Furthermore, the jurisprudence concerning the presumption 
against extraterritorial application does not generally speak to the 
effect of other forums where a claim may be brought.  Instead, the 
focus is on whether the law of the United States can be applied to 
foreign conduct. Notably, the Supreme Court’s oral arguments in 
Kiobel, covered whether the plaintiffs had another forum in which 
to bring suit.172 The idea of the plaintiffs bringing a claim in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands was discussed, but did not ap-
pear in any manner in any of the resulting written opinions for the 
case.173 
V.   CONCLUSION 
Within the last five years, the Supreme Court has invoked a strict 
application of the longstanding doctrine of the presumption against 
extraterritorial application. Morrison and Kiobel guide not just how 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and the Alien Tort Stat-
ute should be applied, but also whether any federal statute may be 
applied extraterritorially.174 This cross between various areas of law 
is evident when analyzing how these decisions came to apply the 
presumption against extraterritoriality: Kiobel, a human rights case, 
relied on Morrison, a securities case, which relied on Aramco, an 
employment discrimination case. These three decisions specifically 
maintain that statutes carry their own private right of action that 
should not be applied extraterritorially without a “clear indication” 
from Congress.175 
Yet, despite a seemingly bright-line rule of strict presumption, 
there remain many open questions surrounding when the presump-
tion may be overcome.  As noted by one commentator, “[t]he 
Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence seems likely to remain a 
                                                                                                             
 172 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
 173 Id. 
 174 See Keenan & Shroff, supra note 57, at 74; see also Hoffman, supra note 
125, at 35 (“Certainly, much of the language in the Roberts opinion suggests that 
he would apply the presumption against extraterritoriality categorically as it was 
applied in Morrison.”). 
 175 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265). 
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mess for some time.”176 Ultimately, the only consistency with the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is its inconsistent application. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 176 Compare William S. Dodge, Loose Canons: International Law and Statu-
tory Interpretation in the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 547, 551 (David L. Sloss, et al. 
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1694653, with Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261 (“Rather than guess anew in each 
case, we apply the presumption [against extraterritoriality] in all cases, preserving 
a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable ef-
fects.”). 
